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Abstract
The effect of London’s congestion charge on the retail sector has aroused considerable
interest since the introduction of the scheme in February 2003. We investigate the impact
of the congestion charge using a variety of econometric models applied to a total retail
sales index for central London (monthly) and weekly retail sales data for the John Lewis
Oxford Street store within the congestion charging zone. The analysis suggests that the
charge had a significant impact on sales at the John Lewis Oxford Street store over the
period studied. However, it also suggests the charge did not affect overall retail sales in
central London, an area larger than but encompassing the congestion charging zone.
Date of receipt of final manuscript: April 2006
1
Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, Volume 41, Part 1, January 2007, pp. 1–21
Paper QUDDUS
1.0 Introduction
On 17 February 2003 London introduced a pioneering congestion charging
scheme. Vehicles present in a 21 square-kilometre zone enclosing the core
shopping, government, entertainment, and business districts between
07:00 and 18:30, Monday to Friday, were subjected to a £5 per day
charge (£8 from July 2005) unless they were eligible for a residents’ discount
or were exempt. Exemptions are granted to environmentally friendly
vehicles (battery powered or hybrid cars), motorcycles, vehicles owned by
disabled drivers (Blue Badge holders), taxis, buses, and certain other
categories deemed to be essential.
The impact on traffic was sudden and dramatic. According to Transport
for London’s own data (TfL, 2003), traffic in the zone has been reduced by
16 per cent (30 per cent for cars; motorcycle, taxi, bus and cycle traffic has
increased). This translates into a 32 per cent reduction in congestion,
measured in terms of delay per kilometre. Average traffic speeds have
increased from 13km/h to 17km/h. Transport for London estimates that
the number of car trips into the zone has fallen by 150,000 per day, of
which 10 to 20 per cent are displaced through trips, 50 to 70 per cent have
shifted to public transport, and 20 to 30 per cent went elsewhere (used
other modes, travelled at other times, or chose alternative destinations).
A series of surveys demonstrated the concern by many retailers in
central London that the congestion charge (CC) was damaging sales. A
2003 survey by the London Chamber of Commerce and Industry of its
members found that 76 per cent of traders reported reduced takings year-
on-year, of which more blamed the congestion charge than the Central
Line (CL) underground rail closure, fear of terrorist attack, economic
downturn, or increasing competition from other sources (Winsor-Cundell,
2003). Another survey from 2003 by London First1 gave a more positive
assessment, although in a 16 February 2004 press release it observed that
‘there may be sectors, especially retail and leisure, where the impact of
the charge may not have been wholly positive’.
Studies based on quantitative data have taken longer to emerge, as such
data only become available with a lag. Taking data up to June 2003, Carmel
(2003) studied retail sales in central London. This study found that the
onset of the decline in sales predated the introduction of the congestion
charge and suggested that the most significant reasons were a general
economic downturn, a fall in overseas visitors, and the closure of the CL.
Quddus et al. (2005), analysing weekly sales data for six John Lewis
1London First, 2003, London Businesses Still Back Congestion Charging, Press Release August 2003.
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stores including one within the charged zone, reported a significant impact
on sales at the store within the zone over a period of about 11 months
following the introduction of the charge.
The proportion of shoppers in central London who travel in by car is
fairly low. An on-street public space survey by Transport for London in
2002 suggests that only 3–6 per cent of shoppers in central London came
in by car. Table 1 shows mode share of shoppers in central London.
Most shoppers interviewed in an on-street survey before the introduction
of congestion charging came in by public transport (around 78 per cent).
This proportion would of course be expected to vary between different
kinds of retail outlet. There is some evidence that John Lewis (JL) custo-
mers are more likely than this to travel in by car.
This paper revisits the question of the CC’s impact on retail with new
data. The primary focus of this paper is to test the impact of the charge
on the retail sector as a whole in central London.2 This is possible as a
new data source has become available covering total central London
retail sales — the London Retail Consortium’s central London Retail
Sales Monitor (LRSM) index. Retail outlets within the congestion charging
zone that depend more on car-borne shopping might be affected more than
others. Therefore, the sales data from the JL Oxford Street store, which
depends more heavily on car-borne shopping, are investigated. The
approach in Quddus et al. (2005) for modelling JL Oxford Street sales
data is extended to include additional explanatory variables, and an alter-
native monthly differenced model is also specified. This paper presents the
2Central London here is defined to coincide with the area covered by the London Retail Consortium’s
central London Retail Sales index. It includes Knightsbridge and High Street Kensington as well as the
congestion charging zone.
Table 1
Mode Share of Shoppers in Central London in 2002
Mode Mode share (per cent)
Bus only 17
London Underground only 34
Walk only 13
Car & Public Transport 1
Car & other 2
Car only 3
Cycle 1
Mixed Public Transport 20
Taxi/Minicab 2
Train only 7
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results of applying similar econometric models to two different dependent
variables:
(1) Total central London retail sales (two types of model: log-linear
monthly sales and differenced log-linear monthly sales).
(2) John Lewis Oxford Street store within the congestion charging zone
(two types of model: log-linear weekly sales and differenced log-
linear monthly sales).
Broadly speaking the results suggest that while the impact on JL Oxford
Street appears to be statistically significant, the impact on the retail sector
as a whole in central London appears not to be so.
2.0 Theoretical Framework
Retail sales are a form of consumer expenditure and so would be expected
to be driven by the same kinds of factors that drive consumption. In other
words, any model purporting to explain retail sales should start from the
premise that the explanatory variables should be similar to ones in a
consumption function. Income and wealth would be powerful influences,
along with factors that affect these. In addition, there may be some
explanatory factors that are specific to retail.
In the case of the models explaining sales at John Lewis Oxford Street,
there is a range of factors thatmight be expected to influence the performance
of this store including regional and local factors, as well as competition
between this and other stores locally and regionally. For the model of central
London retail sales, regional and local factors also need to be taken into
account, but competition is only with stores outside central London (in this
case, outside an area larger than but encompassing the charging zone).
Responses of car-borne shoppers to the charge may include a change of
mode, destination or trip time (referred to collectively as substitution
effects). Alternatively, car-borne shoppers may absorb the charge leading
to a reduction in disposable income and reduced consumer expenditure
(other things being equal), albeit TfL’s spending of the money raised by
the charge will generate some off-setting effects. Responses will be condi-
tioned by the state of information about the scheme. While residents of
central London may have been well aware of the charge, the payment
mechanisms, the boundary of the zone and the period of operation, this
awareness can be expected to decline with distance from the zone. More-
over, the propensity to use a car for shopping may increase with distance
of the trip origin from the zone. Responses to the charge would also be
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expected to change as information disseminates, shoppers adapt to the
charge, and shops adapt to changing shopper behaviour (for example, by
opening on Sundays).
The Central Line of the London Underground was closed for several
months between January andMarch 2003 as the result of a train derailment
at Chancery Lane station on 29 January 2003. Full service was not restored
on the Central Line until June 2003. Although no one was seriously injured
in the derailment, it brought to light a safety risk with the engines of all the
trains used on the Central Line, which as a result had to be checked.
Since the Central Line is one of the main lines serving Oxford Circus
(Oxford Street), Bond Street, and Tottenham Court Road, the closure
might be expected to have impacted on retail spending in these areas.
While some shoppers would be likely to continue coming in to these
shopping centres by alternative modes, such as other underground lines
or the replacement bus services, some might redirect their retail spending
to other locations.
3.0 Data Sources
In principle, the ideal data needed to test the impact of the charge on retail
sales would be a long time series of retail sales both inside and outside the
congestion charging zone with a substantial number of data points both
before and after the introduction of the charge. However, the data available
are of a relatively short time span, stretching (in the case of total central
London sales) between October 2001 and December 2004 and (in the
case of John Lewis sales) between January 2000 and January 2004. In
both cases there are more than three years’ worth of data, though the
John Lewis sales data is weekly while the total central London sales data
is monthly. This section describes the data used in more detail.
3.1 London Retail Sales Monitor data and explanatory variables
Data on total central London retail sales became available in 2004 in the
form of the London Retail Consortium’s LRSM. This is a monthly index
of retail sales in central London compiled by KPMG. Access to this
series was granted to GLA Economics on a confidential basis. The index
covers an area made up of postcodes mainly inside the charging zone
such as the West End but it also includes a few areas outside the zone
such as Knightsbridge and High Street Kensington. This is not ideal but
it is not possible to construct an index just for the charging zone within
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the short- to medium-term. In any case the index is likely to be dominated
by sales in the West End. According to analysis by the Office of the Deputy
Prime Minister (ODPM), in 1999 around 80 per cent of central London
retail sales were inside the charging zone (ODPM, 2002). It should be
noted that the LRSM is a relatively short series stretching back only to
October 2001. Hence, there is not the long time series that would be
necessary to establish really robust relationships.
For UK retail sales, the UKRetail Sales Index (UKRSI) from the Office
for National Statistics (ONS) was used, which is a monthly series. To
represent the congestion charge, a dummy variable was created which
took the value 0 up to March 2003 and the value 1 thereafter. The Central
Line closure (CL) effect was also modelled using a dummy variable (taking
the value 1 between February and June 2003). To capture any economic
trends specific to London, Claimant Count unemployment for London
was used. This can be obtained from the ONS on a monthly basis.
As Figure 1 shows, the LRSM is a very volatile series with clear seasonal
patterns. The patterns are similar in the UKRSI series, but there they
are more muted. The difficulty of trying to test for a CC impact using
a dummy variable is illustrated in the Figure 1. Dummy variables do
Figure 1
Time Series Data for Central London Sales Index (LRSM), UK Retail Sales Index (UK
RSI) and the Congestion Charging dummy (CC) — LRSM in Annual Changes to Preserve
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not contain much variation and are fairly blunt instruments for testing
associations between different factors.
London unemployment (claimant count) is available from the ONS on a
monthly basis and can act as a proxy for London income and London-
specific economic conditions. Figure 2 shows the data for London
unemployment (LonU).
3.2 The John Lewis sales data and explanatory variables
Sales data for the JL Oxford Street branch were analysed for the period of
30 January 2000 to 3 January 2004. This period includes three years before
the CC and nearly one year afterwards. Within this period, the store was
usually open from Monday to Saturday, but not Sundays and public
holidays. It was decided to end the period of analysis on 3 January 2004
because John Lewis started to open their Oxford Street store on Sundays
from 4 January 2004, making a before and after comparison of the
impact of the CC more difficult as Sunday trading increases total weekly
sales. Weekly sales data for 205 weeks (30 January 2000 to 3 January
2004) were obtained.
The comparative time plot of weekly sales for the JL Oxford Street store
between 2002 and 2003 is shown in Figure 3. Different events that occurred
in 2003 are also indicated on the plot by arrows. These are the Central Line
(CL) closure, the application of the Congestion Charge (CC), the beginning
and ‘ending’ of the Iraq War (IW), and various annual events. This plot
Figure 2
London Unemployment (LonU) (Claimant Count)
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also suggests that weekly sales in 2003 are consistently lower than 2002
sales. Retail sales are usually influenced by the Easter holidays, being
high just before Easter and low just after Easter. However, Easter changes
from year to year, for example Easter Day was 31 March in 2002 but 20
April in 2003. The comparative time plot of weekly numbers of transactions
for John Lewis Oxford Street exhibits a similar pattern to the weekly sales,
but is not shown here for brevity.
In Quddus et al. (2005) economic conditions were controlled for by the
inclusion of UK GDP, the exchange rate and a price index for furniture —
none of which were found to be significant. This paper tries to extend this
approach by including London-specific economic variables. London GVA
(Gross Value Added) data were obtained from Experian Business
Strategies rather than the ONS, because official data on London GVA
are only available with a significant lag. In addition the problem of endo-
geneity (the independent variable London GVA includes the dependent
variable John Lewis Oxford Street sales) was avoided by obtaining a data
series for London GVA minus retail. The two series are shown in Figure
4. Clearly GVA minus Retail tracks London GVA fairly closely. It is
also important to note that GVA, like most economic data, is a quarterly
series whereas the dependent variable was weekly or monthly. More
Figure 3
Time Plot of John Lewis Oxford Street Weekly Sales for 2003 and 2002
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frequent series tend to have more variation, and therefore more explana-
tory power, than quarterly series.
Other economic variables which were included in the JL Oxford Street
model include London visitor expenditure (London overseas visitor
expenditure which is derived from the International Passenger Survey
obtained from the ONS) and the CPI for furniture and household items
price index (also from the ONS). Overseas visitor spending is included
because tourist spending is important for retailers in central London and
the furniture index is an attempt to include some price information in the
model since, other things being equal, higher retail prices should mean
lower retail sales. Overseas visitor expenditure is a quarterly variable and
so was interpolated, but the CPI for furniture and household items series
is monthly. The CPI is a UK level variable as an appropriate regional
price index does not exist.
4.0 Model Specification
The general approach of this paper is to estimate a series of regression
models explaining retail sales over time (either for total central London
Figure 4
Time Series Data for London GVA and London GVA minus Retail (Constant 2000 Prices)
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or the JL Oxford Street store). The regression models test how far the data
on retail sales depend on other factors that may affect retail sales. Both
types of model include variables for the CL closure, and both control for
seasonal fluctuations. The impact of the CC is then tested by including a
variable for the charge and seeing whether it yields a statistically significant
coefficient.
The variable representing the CC adopted in this paper is a dummy
variable that takes a value of 1 during the times when congestion charging
was operating and a value of 0 at all other times. This variable is a relatively
blunt instrument to measure an impact from the congestion charge as it
assumes that there is an effect that is unvarying in strength over time.
Although the charge itself did not vary during this period there is no
reason to assume that its effect on retail sales was similarly unvarying. It
is also a blunt instrument in the context of this study because the periodicity
of the data does not permit great precision in the time-identification of the
effect (monthly). Compared to the ideal variable, which might be something
like the number of people in cars travelling into the zone on a daily basis,
the dummy variable in our study lacks precision, but no better variable is
available. Three different types of regression model are used in this study.
They are described below.
4.1 Modelling of LRSM and retail sales of the JL Oxford Street store
Quddus et al. (2005) showed that the association of sales with the conges-
tion charge, the closure of the Central Line, the state of the economy, the
consumer price index, the number of overseas visitors to London, trend,
and seasonality could be best established using a log-linear model instead
of a linear model. Therefore this model form is selected to model the
time series data of individual stores.
A log-linear model with first degree autoregressive error term, AR(1),
can be written as
ln yt ¼ aþ b lnX t þ hDt þ et; ð1Þ
where the errors satisfy
et ¼ ret1 þ Zt:
yt is the value of sales for period t (say, week t), X t is a k 1 vector of
continuous explanatory variables, D is a m 1 vector of dummy explana-
tory variables, e is white noise, r (1 < rj j < 1) is the autocorrelation
coefficient, and Zt is independent and identically distributed error term
with zero mean and variance s2. b and h are appropriately sized vectors
of parameters to be estimated.
Journal of Transport Economics and Policy Volume 41, Part 1
10
4.2 Differenced models for LRSM and JL Oxford Street store
In the above econometric models, the dependent variable is the weekly
sales, whereas some of the explanatory variables, such as economic
variables (for example, GVA, CPI), are monthly or quarterly. It may not
be appropriate to explain the variation in weekly sales with the monthly
or quarterly economic variables that cannot be obtained in weekly form.
Therefore, it may be more appropriate if the above econometric models
could be estimated using monthly sales. The intrinsic problem of using
monthly sales is the short period (48 months) of available time-series
data. With only 47 observations per store, it may not be feasible to estimate
a total of 19 parameters (b0 and h0). Therefore, a differenced model is
proposed that can automatically eliminate seasonality from the data. The
model that relates monthly sales y to a sequence of factors x1; . . . ; xn,
namely y ¼ f ðx1; . . . ;xnÞ, can be linearised as follows:
dy ¼ @y
@x1
dx1 þ . . . þ
@y
@xn
dxn: ð2Þ
In our case the model is log-linear, so
d ln y ¼ @ ln y
@ ln x1
d ln x1 þ . . . þ
@ ln y
@ ln xn
d ln xn; ð3Þ
where
@ ln y
@ ln xi
¼ @y
@xi
 xi
y
; ð4Þ
is the elasticity of monthly sales with respect to the factor i.
Monthly sales follow a seasonal pattern (see Figure 3), so everything else
being equal we expect January 2001 sales to equal January 2002 sales, and
so on. Hence the following differenced model may be applied to remove
monthly seasonal variation:
ln yt  ln yt12 ¼ b1ðln x1;t  ln x1;t12Þ
þ . . . þ bnðln xn;t  ln xn;t12Þ: ð5Þ
In the case of dummy variables, ln xi;t ¼ 1 if factor i is present in period t
and ln xi;t ¼ 0 otherwise. The dummy variables considered were the
presence or absence of congestion charging and the closure or otherwise
of the Central Line.
The addition of a constant (b0) allows for exponential growth in sales:
ln yt  ln yt12 ¼ b0 þ b1ðln x1;t  ln x1;t12Þ
þ . . . þ bnðln xn;t  ln xn;t12Þ: ð6Þ
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This model can be fitted by OLS, which provides consistent estimates of
b0;b1; . . . ; bn (see Verbeek, 2000).
5.0 Results
5.1 Central London retail sales index
The relationship between the congestion charge and total central London
retail sales was investigated using the central London retail sales index
(LRSM) which is a monthly series. A range of explanatory variables
were tested. Two main model structures are presented here — a log-
linear model and a differenced model. The results and interpretation for
these are presented below.
5.1.1 Log-linear model results
Table 2 shows the estimation results for two versions of the log-linear
model. Model A has just one dummy variable representing the congestion
charge effect and Model B splits this variable into two:
. CC 2003, which takes the value 1 in the months that congestion
charging was in operation during 2003 and 0 elsewhere, and
. CC 2004, which takes the value 1 in the months that the charge was
operating during 2004 (effectively all of 2004) and 0 at other times.
Both models use monthly dummy variables to account for seasonal fluc-
tuation. The interpretation of the results is as follows.
Effect of the congestion charge and the Central Line In Model A the effect
of the congestion charge is not significantly different from zero at the 95 per
cent confidence level. In addition, the coefficient for the CC effect in Model
A is positive, suggesting that the charge is associated with a positive impact
on retail sales in central London.
In recognition that dummy variables are rather crude instruments that
may pick up lots of different effects, this result was probed further by
splitting the CC dummy into two — shown in Model B. This testing of
the time-invariance of the CC dummy revealed two things. First it
showed that the CC dummy is not time-invariant. While the dummy for
2003 (CC 2003) remains statistically insignificant, the 2004 variable is
significant with a coefficient of 0.0475. This corresponds to an effect of
100  expðyÞ  1f g or 4.6 per cent. It cannot, however, be properly
called a congestion charging effect as it operates only during 2004 and
Journal of Transport Economics and Policy Volume 41, Part 1
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not 2003, while congestion charging was a constant influence during both
years. It is likely that this effect points to a missing variable in our analysis
— it may be the impact of cumulative interest rate rises by the Bank of
England and the slowdown in the housing market, which we have not
been able to include in the model. Circumstantial evidence favouring this
hypothesis is the slowdown in the retail sales indices during the latter
part of 2004.
The Central Line dummy variable is significant in both models with a
fairly large coefficient. In Model B the coefficient implies that the Central
Line effect had a negative impact on central London retail sales of
around 3.6 per cent (though of course it did not last for a full year).
Economic variables In line with the theoretical framework for this study,
economic variables for income (London GVA, or London GVA minus
Retail) and wealth (UK household net assets) were tested, but no
Table 2
Model Estimation Results for Central London Retail Sales Index
Central London Retail Sales Model: Loglinear
Dependent variable¼ ln(LRSM)
Model A — One CC variable Model B — Two CC variables
Explanatory variables Coef. t-stat p-value Coef. t-stat p-value
LnUKRSI 0.4032 2.13 0.04 1.0445 5.31 0.00
LnLonU 0.2044 1.32 0.20 0.1497 1.32 0.20
CC 0.0059 0.44 0.66 — — —
CC 2003 — — — 0.0024 0.24 0.82
CC 2004 — — — 0.0475 3.12 0.01
Central Line 0.0257 2.50 0.02 0.0379 4.75 0.00
January 0.4836 32.98 0.00 0.4898 45.35 0.00
February (reference)
March 0.2540 17.05 0.00 0.2366 20.54 0.00
April 0.0606 3.51 0.00 0.0212 1.39 0.18
May 0.0708 4.20 0.00 0.0354 2.43 0.02
June 0.4334 24.44 0.00 0.3943 25.45 0.00
July 0.2776 14.33 0.00 0.2246 12.29 0.00
August 0.0754 4.38 0.00 0.0400 2.71 0.01
September 0.3700 22.77 0.00 0.3330 23.21 0.00
October 0.1756 9.08 0.00 0.1148 5.93 0.00
November 0.2161 6.10 0.00 0.0913 2.43 0.02
December 0.7389 11.31 0.00 0.5046 7.22 0.00
Constant Omit 2.47 0.02 Omit 0.26 0.80
Observations 39 39
R-squared 0.997 0.998
Adjusted R-Squared 0.995 0.997
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satisfactory relationship was found with central London retail sales
(LRSM). Different combinations and lag structures were tried, but
whenever the coefficients were statistically significant, the coefficient signs
were usually negative, implying a counterintuitive and theoretically
unsound negative impact of income and wealth on retail spending. This
may be because of the shortness of the time series and the difference in
time periods — income and wealth variables are only available on a quar-
terly basis and so need to be interpolated, entailing an artificial smoothing
of the series. This may mean that there is insufficient variation left in the
series to pick up the variation in a volatile monthly series such as the
LRSM. Variables for tourism expenditure were also tried, but again no
theoretically consistent relationship was found.
The approach eventually adopted was to use UK retail sales (UKRSI)
as a proxy for all factors that affect retail sales in general throughout the
country, and London unemployment (LonU) to capture any London
specific economic factors. UKRSI is significant in both Model A and
Model B and the coefficient is of a plausible sign and magnitude. In
particular, in Model B the coefficient is around one, implying that central
London retail sales tend to change in the same proportion as national
retail sales. This seems intuitively correct. Central London’s retail market
is not isolated from the influences that affect retail in the rest of the UK.
London unemployment is not significant at the 95 per cent level, but the
sign and size of the coefficient are consistent with theory (higher unemploy-
ment is associated with lower retail sales).
The potential drawback of using UK retail sales is that the assumption
of independence of the explanatory variables and the error terms may be
violated; that is, UK retail sales may be an endogenous variable. Since
central London retail sales is only a small part of total UK retail sales
this may not be expected to be a significant problem. Nonetheless, an
instrumental variables regression was run with lagged values of UKRSI
as the instruments and a Hausman test performed to check whether the
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) coefficients were consistent. The null
hypothesis that the OLS coefficients are consistent could not be rejected
at the 5 per cent or even 10 per cent level. Tests were also performed for
unit roots in the LRSM and UKRSI series as such series can often be
non-stationary. The null hypothesis of stationarity could not be rejected
in either case.
5.1.2 Differenced monthly model results
Though no evidence of misspecification was found in diagnostic tests of
Model B, a differenced model was tested to see whether it supported the
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results of Model B. Since the data are monthly, twelfth differences were
used. The results are presented in Table 3 below and they support the
results from the log-linear model.
The impact of the congestion charging dummy variable is again not
statistically significant, and again the coefficient is positive. The effect of
UK retail sales (Differenced LnUKRSI) is not significant, but the coefficient
remains of a plausible sign and size; similarly for the effect of London
unemployment. The only effect which remains significant is the impact of
the Central Line closure.
In summary the models of total central London retail sales show no
statistically significant effect of the congestion charge.
5.2 JL Oxford Street store
5.2.1 Log-linear model results
The association of the John Lewis Oxford Street sales and the explanatory
variables is established using a log-linear model with an AR(1) disturbance.
Tests were performed for unit roots in the weekly sales and GVA minus
retail series as such series can often be non-stationary. The null hypothesis
of stationarity could not be rejected in either case. The result is presented in
Table 4 (the constant has been omitted to preserve confidentiality). Two
types of model are presented. The first model uses John Lewis Oxford
Street weekly sales and the second uses John Lewis Oxford Street monthly
sales. Some of the variables in the monthly model seem to be insignificant.
Perhaps this is due to insufficient degrees of freedom in the model as
Table 3
Model Estimation Results for Central London Retail Sales
Central London Retail Sales Model: Differenced
Dependent variable¼DLnLRSM
Explanatory variables Coef. t-stat p-value
Differenced LnUKRSI 0.6507 1.23 0.23
Differenced LnLonU 0.1584 1.02 0.32
Differenced CC 0.0107 0.68 0.50
Differenced Central Line 0.0230 2.03 0.06
Constant 0.0119 0.55 0.59
Observations 27
R-squared 0.5163
Adjusted R-Squared 0.4284
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explained in the methodology section. The interpretation of the results is as
follows:
The effect of the congestion charge The effect of the congestion charge is
captured by a dummy variable. This variable is found to be negatively asso-
ciated with the weekly sales of John Lewis Oxford Street and is statistically
significantly different from zero at the 95 per cent confidence level. This is
an indication that average weekly sales are decreased after the introduction
of congestion charging if all other factors remain constant before and after
the application of the charge. This finding is consistent with the results of
Table 4
Model Estimation Results for John Lewis Oxford Street Weekly and
Monthly Sales
JLOS Model: Loglinear with AR(1)
Dependent variable¼ ln(weekly or monthly sales at JLOS)
Weekly model Monthly model
Explanatory variables Coef. t-stat p-value Coef. t-stat p-value
Congestion charge 0.0723 3.03 0.00 0.1189 2.72 0.01
ln(OC_and_BS_passengers) 0.5127 8.07 0.00 0.2431 0.88 0.39
ln(Bus journeys) 0.9302 3.38 0.00 0.5818 0.50 0.62
ln(London_GVA_minus_retail) 1.7027 2.54 0.01 0.5463 0.39 0.70
ln(London_visitor_expenditure) 0.1340 2.07 0.04 0.0911 0.71 0.49
ln(CPI_furniture) 0.4100 0.26 0.80 2.9986 1.14 0.26
Easter 0.0987 2.82 0.01
Christmas 0.1640 4.35 0.00 — — —
Clearance 0.3760 10.12 0.00 — — —
January 0.0284 0.87 0.39 0.0521 0.80 0.43
February (Reference/base variable) — — —
March 0.0516 1.47 0.14 0.1431 2.25 0.03
April 0.0303 0.95 0.34 0.1205 1.28 0.21
May 0.0046 0.12 0.91 0.1846 1.87 0.07
June 0.0436 1.3 0.20 0.0970 1.10 0.28
July 0.0687 1.63 0.11 0.2798 1.78 0.09
August 0.0432 1.04 0.30 0.1378 1.00 0.33
September 0.0046 0.1 0.92 0.2552 1.90 0.07
October 0.0340 0.83 0.41 0.3138 1.82 0.08
November 0.0849 1.93 0.06 0.4659 2.67 0.01
December 0.3014 5.88 0.00 0.7243 3.98 0.00
Trend (Cumulative week) 0.00076 1.48 0.14 0.0067 0.82 0.42
Constant Omit 3.71 0.00 Omit 1.34 0.19
Observations 204 48
R-square 0.85 0.94
Adjusted R-square 0.83 0.91
Autocorrelation coefficient 0.18 0.16
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the econometric models by Quddus et al. (2005). The coefficient (y) of the
effect of the congestion charge represented by a dummy variable is
0.0723, indicating that the relative effect on the average weekly sales of
John Lewis Oxford Street due to the presence of the congestion charge is
100  expðyÞ  1f g, or 6.9 per cent. In other words, the congestion
charge reduces the expected weekly sales of John Lewis Oxford Street by
6.9 per cent holding all other factors included in the model constant.
The effect of the closure of the central line The effect of the closure of the
Central Line is captured by a continuous variable, which is total weekly
passengers (both exit and entry) passing through Oxford Circus (OC)
and Bond Street (BS) underground stations, OC_and_BS_passengers.
This is found to be statistically different from zero at the 95 per cent
confidence level and, as expected, positively associated with the JL
Oxford Street’s weekly sales (Table 4). The result suggests that a 1 per
cent increase in OC_and_BS_passengers would lead to an increase of 0.5
per cent in weekly sales.
The effect of bus journeys Following the introduction of the congestion
charging, bus journeys within the charged zone during the critical morning
peak hour were estimated to increase by 14 per cent (TfL, 2003). Oxford
Street, where the John Lewis Oxford Street store is located, has very
good bus accessibility. Therefore, it is worthwhile to see whether increased
bus journeys, as a proxy for accessibility by bus, have any impact on the
John Lewis retail business. Transport for London provided quarterly bus
journeys data for Central London from 2000 to 2004. Bus journeys in
Central London are found to be positively associated with the John
Lewis weekly sales at the Oxford Street store. This is an expected result
as increased bus journeys enable more commuters/customers to travel to
Central London. Table 4 shows that the elasticity associated with bus
journeys is 0.93 and it is statistically significant.
London economic variables Quddus et al. (2005) used national GDP
instead of London GDP as an economic variable in their econometric
models. This might be the reason why the economic variable turned out
to be statistically insignificant in the models as London’s economy does
not necessarily follow the UK trend. Note, however, that using the
London GDP as an explanatory variable yields a new problem. As retail
is a significant part of the GDP, the explanatory variable (London GDP)
will not be independent of the sales (the dependent variable). This contra-
dicts the assumption of the explanatory variable being independent of the
error term. Hence, the retail part of GVA was subtracted from London
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GVA. The new variable is named as London_GVA_minus_Retail (Table
4), which is used in this study to see whether there is a relationship between
the London economy and John Lewis retail sales. This is found to be
statistically significant at the 95 per cent confidence level and positively
associated with John Lewis Oxford Street weekly sales. The elasticity
associated with this variable can be seen to be high compared to others
(See Table 4).
Expenditure by London visitors is also found to be positively associated
with the John Lewis Oxford Street weekly sales. The consumer price index
(CPI) for furniture and household items was also included and found to be
statistically insignificant.
Annual events It is found that various annual events such as Easter, the
July clearance sales and the Christmas sales affect retail activity as expected.
These factors are statistically significant in the model at the 95 per cent
confidence level with the expected signs. The coefficient for the July
clearance sales is the highest followed by the Christmas period and the
Easter period.
Effect of seasons and trend The method of dummy variables is used to
remove the seasonal component from the time series of weekly sales at
John Lewis Oxford Street. We have assumed that the variable ‘season’ has
twelve classes, the months of a year, thereby requiring the use of eleven
dummy variables. If there is a seasonal pattern present in various months,
the estimated differential intercepts (bj, where j ¼ 1 to 11) will reflect it
only if they are statistically significant. It is possible that only some of
these differential intercepts are statistically significant so that only some
months may have significantly different sales. The month of February is
taken as the base month in the model. The results show that only differential
coefficients associated with October, November and December are statisti-
cally significant at the 95 per cent confidence level. Thus one may conclude
that there are some seasonal factors operating in those months.
Econometric models that use time-series data may include a trend term.
By a trend we mean a sustained upward or downward movement in the
behaviour of a variable. This trend term can serve as a proxy for a variable
that affects the dependent variable (weekly sales) and is not directly
observable but is highly correlated with time. A trend term could be
either a continuous function of time or a categorical variable. In this
model, the trend term is a continuous exponential growth function of
cumulative weeks starting with t ¼ 1 and ending with t ¼ 205. The contin-
uous trend function is found to be statistically insignificant at the 95 per
cent confidence level.
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5.2.2 Differenced monthly model results
The differenced model presented in (3) is used to investigate further the
effect of the congestion charge on the John Lewis Oxford Street retail
business. The result is presented in Table 5. It can be seen that the finding
is consistent with the result of the monthly model presented in Table 4. Only
the dummy variable for the congestion charge is found to be statistically
significant. Most of the economic variables are found to be statistically
insignificant.
6.0 Discussions and Conclusions
The effect of London’s congestion charge on the retail sector was analysed
using a variety of econometric models applied to a total retail sales index
for central London (monthly) and weekly retail sales data for the John
Lewis Oxford Street store inside the charging zone. The analysis suggests
that the charge had a significant impact on sales (sales were about 7 per
cent down) at the John Lewis store on Oxford Street over the period
studied. However, it also suggests the charge did not affect overall retail
sales in central London, an area larger than but encompassing the conges-
tion charging zone. While estimating the impact of the congestion charge,
the study controls for other factors that may also influence retail sales such
as London GVA (Gross Value Added), London tourism, Consumer Price
Index (CPI), the closure of the Central Line, and various annual events of
Table 5
Difference Model Estimation Result for John Lewis Oxford Street Monthly
Sales
Difference Model for John Lewis Oxford Street Store
Explanatory variables Coef. t-stat p-value
Congestion Charge (Dummy) 0.1141 2.07 0.05
Differenced ln(OC_and_BS_passengers) 0.2375 0.77 0.45
Differenced ln(bus journeys) 0.0178 0.02 0.99
Difference ln(CPI) 0.1354 0.09 0.93
Differenced ln(GVA_minus_retail) 0.0264 0.18 0.86
Differenced ln(tourist expenditure) 1.2639 0.36 0.72
Differenced ln(net wealth) 0.1649 0.87 0.39
Constant 0.0140 0.14 0.89
Observations 36
R-square 0.48
Adjusted R-square 0.35
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importance to retail. All models provide the expected results for these
variables.
The results from the models of total central London retail sales and the
models of JL retail sales seem to provide different answers to the research
question. However, these different results are not necessarily contradictory.
It may well be the case that a store such as JL on Oxford Street has been
affected by the CC even though there is no overall effect at the sector
level in central London. A plausible hypothesis might be that JL Oxford
Street is particularly likely to be affected by the charge because a relatively
large proportion of its sales come from car-borne customers (who may
come from outside Greater London and may be buying bulky items for
which a car is convenient). Indeed, Bell et al. (2004) present some evidence
that backs this up. A survey of John Lewis customers at the Oxford Street
store found that almost 10 per cent mostly or always used a private car
(before charging). This is a far higher proportion than the 3 to 6 per cent
of shoppers who use a car for shopping in general in central London
according to on-street surveys for TfL in 2002 (Carmel, 2004).
The dip in central London sales in 2004 might be a lagged congestion
charge effect, although without any further evidence supporting this
hypothesis we should be wary of asserting this, especially as retail sales in
the UK as a whole also dipped in 2004. One recommendation for future
work is to use other data series that would allow us to test the hypothesis
that there was a lagged effect from the CC in 2004 against the hypothesis
that there was some other (UK-wide) effect in 2004.
One important factor that it has not been possible to deal with within
this study is the impact of competition. Competition with other stores
(both within the charging zone and outside it) may explain part of the
drop in sales for the JL Oxford Street store, although we are unaware of
any evidence for this. On the contrary, there is some survey data in
Bell et al. (2004) that suggests that respondents who visited the JL
Oxford Street store less after the introduction of charging also visited
the Oxford Street area less often. However, this survey only covered JL
Oxford Street Account Holders and so cannot be taken as conclusive
evidence on the absence of competition effects within Oxford Street on
the JL Oxford Street store’s performance.
The results from the model of total central London retail sales may
include some spatial substitution. That is, even though no impact was
found on retail sales as a whole, it is still possible that there has been
some redistribution of sales from certain stores or areas to other stores
within central London (for example, from Oxford Street to Knightsbridge
or High Street Kensington). This would not be picked up by the model
because it looked only at total central London retail sales; however, as
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previously noted, central London retail sales are likely to be mainly
influenced by sales within the charging zone.
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